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This paper aims at showing how the game theory can be applied to the quantitative study 
of extended warranty (EW). This kind of after-sales service represents an additional non-
compulsory coverage, which the consumer can or not buy after the acquisition of some 
device, starting subsequently to the end of the base warranty (BW) period. Thus, a model, 
in which two players interact, is shown, i. e. the original equipment manufacturer (OEM), 
in charge of assigning prices to the equipment and to the extended warranty service; and 
the customer (owner of the device). The way, in which the parts interact, is modeled through 
the Stackelberg leadership game, which was originally applied in the analysis of the oli-
gopolies competition market. In this particular model, the leader represents the OEM and 
the follower is the customer, where the OEM’s goal is to find a certain price structure to max-
imize his profit and consequently influence the buyer’s decision. Through this adaptation, 
the strategies and payoffs of players are defined. The robustness of the model is due to in-
corporating elements of the economic theory (consumer’s surplus, producer’s surplus, con-
sumer’s reservation price, choice under uncertainty, maximum profit and contingent consump-
tion plan) and elements of the reliability theory (probability of failure and non-repairable 
systems). Additionally, a numerical example and a sensitivity analysis of parameters are 
presented to highlight the model. Finally, this research systematizes the steps of Stackelberg 
game under the modeling of extended warranty (EW) as well.
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The process of globalization has increased 
the competition among companies, which 
have sought strategic advantages to continue 
in the market. On the other hand, the cus-
tomers have become very rigorous in the pur-
chase of their products, once their decision 
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process includes price, payment method, 
quality, the degree of product substitution, 
reliability, practicality and after-sales ser-
vices offered. Hence, companies need to de-
fine their goals with the buyers’ necessity to 
keep competitive and increase their profits.
Among the points that influence the cus-
tomer’s decision to buy, the after-sales ser-
vices have some special features. A good 
execution of services can increase the suc-
cess rate in inserting new products in the 
market, a way to find new customers and 
retain older ones; these actions can increase 
the profitability of the companies [Clark, 
Armistead, 1991; Jonke, 2012]. From this 
broad set of after-sales services activities, 
the extended warranty (EW) has been a trend 
widely adopted by firms over the recent de-
cades [Murthy, 2000].
EW is defined as a voluntary agreement 
between the provider (manufacturer, re-
tailer or a third party) and the buyer of 
the equipment, which he can or not buy 
[Murthy, Djamaludin, 2002]. This kind of 
service is usually purchased at the moment 
of the sale of an item and can be seen as 
insurance, starting after the base warranty 
period (mandatory coverage) [Rahman, Chat-
topadhyay, 2015; Murthy, Jack, 2014]. If 
the device fails, the EW provider must take 
a specific action, such as repair activities, 
replacement of a broken item and/or finan-
cial compensation to the owner of the equip-
ment [Pope et al., 2014].
From the moment when the EW provid-
er delivers this service to his buyers, his 
costs will be stochastic, as failures are not 
deterministic events. They are called “war-
ranty servicing” costs and represent the 
cost of rectifying a broken item along the 
EW period [Shafiee, Chukova, 2013]. The 
four main factors that affect this kind of 
cost are the coverage period to be deter-
mined, the benefits offered to consumers, 
the claim frequency (quantity of times that 
the EW will be required) and the claim se-
verity degree [Rai, Singh, 2004].
The economic weight of the warranty 
can be seen, for instance, in the annual 
report of General Motors [Annual Report..., 
2015]. In 2015, this company got a global 
revenue of 152,36 billion dollars, while its 
warranty costs were 9,279 billion dollars, 
that is, 6% of its billing. Thus, it is fun-
damental to know how to project warranty 
policies, balancing the benefits and costs 
associated to this kind of service due to 
the impact on the profitability of firms.
Thomas and Rao argue that the building 
of warranty models has been associated to: 
(1) the establishment of conditions and pa-
rameters that influence the cost of produc-
ing the products and (2) predicting the 
monetary amount that must be destined to 
warranty actions, for instance, financial 
compensation to the buyer and repair (main-
tenance) costs [Thomas, Rao, 1999].
It is necessary to emphasize that the 
insertion of the EW produces different per-
ceptions among the agents. The customer 
when buying additional service wants to 
get an extra protection after the end of the 
base warranty [Murthy, Djamaludin, 2002]. 
On the other hand, the EW provider tries 
to maximize his profit by adding extra ac-
tivities to his set of after-sales services 
[Maronick, 2007; Murthy, Jack, 2014].
A way of seeing the customer-EW pro-
vider relationship is through the game 
theory [Murthy, Karim, Ahmadi, 2015]. 
A  game represents a strategic mutual in-
teraction between more than one person as 
his/her action affects the payoff of anoth-
er person [Gibbons, 1997]. Thus, there is 
a big involvement between decision-makers 
(or players), who need to develop strategies 
and action plans considering this reciprocal 
effect. Additionally, this tool is useful for 
suggesting or advising the players about 
best way to take their actions [Morris, 
1994].
Among the types of games used in the 
literature that model the relationship be-
tween the decision-makers [Fujiwara-Greve, 
427Extended Warranty: An Approach via Stackelberg Game
RMJ 15 (4): 425–440 (2017)
2015], the Stackelberg game (SG), origi-
nally applied in oligopolistic competition, 
has been used in quantitative modeling of 
the after-sales services. This game has been 
adapted to many situations, especially to 
extended warranty, maintenance outsourc-
ing, maintenance service contracts and lease 
contracts [Ashgarizadeh, Murthy, 2000; Es-
maeili, Gamchi, Asgharizadeh, 2014; Ha-
midi, Liao, Szidarovszky, 2016; Kurata, 
Nam, 2013; Li, Mallik, Chhajed, 2012; Mur-
thy, Asgharizadeh, 1998; Murthy, Asgha-
rizadeh, 1999; Murthy, Yeung, 1995; Wei, 
Zhao, Li, 2015].
Another key point in after-sales model-
ing is about characteristics of the system 
to be considered, for instance whether the 
device is a repairable or a non-repairable 
system. If the equipment fails and cannot 
return to its operational state, that is, the 
item does not receive maintenance actions 
after breaking down, it can be defined as 
a non-repairable system (such as bulbs or 
batteries). On the other hand, if the equip-
ment fails and it can receive maintenance 
actions, such as restoration/renovation of 
its components, it is defined as a repairable 
system (for instance, vehicle maintenance) 
[Crow, 1975]. This premise is fundamental 
because, based on it, maintenance actions, 
warranty policies and failure repair pro-
cesses are defined [Yanez, Joglar, Modarres, 
2002].
Therefore, this paper explores the math-
ematical model on extended warranty ap-
plied to non-repairable systems as seen by 
[Murthy, Jack, 2014]. The main contribu-
tions to this research are related to the 
microeconomic ambiance in the extended 
warranty study, to the inclusion of a nu-
merical example and to a sensitivity analy-
sis of the probability of equipment. Ad di-
tionally, the present paper outlines Stackel-
berg game steps for the proposed study, 
serving as a framework to further studies 
involving the SG in the modeling of after-
sales services.
The paper is structured in 4 sections. In 
Section 1 a theoretical background is pre-
sented emphasizing the application of the 
Stackelberg game in modeling after-sales 
services. Subsequently, in Section 2 the 
model is illustrated under microeconomic 
ambiance, inserting Stackelberg game as 
a way to solve the research problem exposed. 
In Section 3 a numerical example and its 
extension are evidenced. Finally, the last 
part of this study summarizes all informa-
tion presented and proposes future contri-
butions.
1.  thEorEtical background
The Stackelberg game was developed by 
Heinrich von Stackelberg, being applied 
originally in the oligopolistic competition 
(see, f. e. [von Stackelberg, 2011]), based 
on which the firms define the amount of 
a  homogeneous product to be put on the 
market hierarchically over an established 
period of time [Bagchi, 1984; Gibbons, 
1992]. This sequential structure has an 
important effect on the definition of equi-
librium of the Stackelberg game. For in-
stance, table 1 represents a payoff matrix 
of a bimatrix game, in which the players 
(Line and Column) have two dichotomous 
strategies (A, B).
If this game is simultaneous, then the 
Nash equilibrium will be the pair of strat-
egies (A, A) and the payoff of the Line 
player will correspond to 3. However, if this 
game is sequential and the Line player is 
the first to take action, then the Nash equi-
librium will be the pair of strategies (B, B) 
Table 1
payoff matrix
player column
a B
player line
a (3, 1) (5, 0)
B (2, 0) (4, 2)
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and his payoff will correspond to 4. This 
situation shows a peculiar characteristic, 
the “first mover advantage”, that is, the 
first player (the leader) presents a greater 
power of choice and decision over the second 
player (the follower) [Pindyck, Ru binfeld, 
2001].
It is also necessary to reinforce the way 
of solving the Stackelberg game, i. e., the 
backward induction. This procedure involv-
es initially solving the decision problem of 
the follower and posteriorly solving the 
decision problem of the leader [Gibbons, 
1992; Pin dyck, Rubinfeld, 2001; Fujiwara-
Greve, 2015]. Thus, the Stackelberg game 
is viewed as a conditioned optimization 
problem in which the follower maximizes 
his payoff via the previous movement of 
the leader through his reaction function 
[Varian, 1992]. Finally, the action (“best 
response”) of the second player corresponds 
to his better strategy given any action tak-
en by the leader [Bagchi, 1984].
The two points presented above (the se-
quential two-step structure and the back-
ward induction) have been adopted in the 
design of quantitative models of outsourc-
ing of maintenance, of maintenance service 
contracts, of warranty, of extended war-
ranty and of leasing contracts.
The starting point of the after-sales 
service quantitative modeling that applies 
the Stackelberg game is the study by [Mur-
thy, Yeung, 1995]. These authors devel-
oped a strategic decision-making framework 
involving the service agent and the owner 
of the equipment under the service contract 
considering either planned or failure re-
placement.
Murthy and Asgharizadeh developed 
three papers that deal with the interaction 
between the owner of the equipment and 
the service agent [Murthy, Asgharizadeh, 
1998; 1999; Ashgarizadeh, Murthy, 2000] 
applied in the after-sales services ambi-
ance. In [Murthy, Asgharizadeh, 1998] 
they developed a game of two players (the 
service agent and the owner of the equip-
ment). For this model, the service agent 
is in charge of assigning prices to a service 
contract (warranty) and to a non-addition-
al coverage service (without warranty), 
while the owner of the equipment needs 
to choose whether to buy the device or 
not, as well as whether to buy the war-
ranty service or not. The EW provider’s 
goal is to maximize his profit under his 
buyer’s best option. The authors expand-
ed the problem by considering an ambiance 
of multiple customers [Ashgarizadeh, Mur-
thy, 2000] and multiple service channels 
which would provide maintenance of the 
devices [Mur thy, Asgha ri za deh, 1999]. Thus, 
papers [Murthy, As gha ri zadeh, 1999; Ash-
ga ri zadeh, Murthy, 2000] incorporated the 
queueing theory in after-sales service mod-
eling.
In [Murthy, Yeung, 1995; Mur thy, As-
gharizadeh, 1998; Murthy, As gha ri zadeh, 
1999; Ashgarizadeh, Murthy, 2000] the 
leader is the service agent, that is, he takes 
the first action, showing the price structure 
to his customers, while the buyers are fol-
lowers, that is, they respond optimally to 
the leader’s actions (second action). From 
this interaction, the players’ payoffs are 
generated and the Nash equilibrium is 
reached.
Authors [Esmaeili, Gamchi, Asghari za-
deh, 2014] adopted a game with three play-
ers: the OEM, the service agent and the 
customer. In this model, the authors show-
ed the interaction of the players by means 
of non-cooperative and semi-cooperative 
games. Under one of these scenarios, the 
manufacturer has more power than the 
service agent does and the service agent 
has more power than the customer does, 
i. e., there are two Stackelberg games, the 
first with the manufacturer and the service 
agent as players, whereas the second has 
the service agent and the buyer. Another 
scenario considers the OEM and the service 
agent cooperating (as leaders) while the 
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customer is the follower (semi-cooperative 
game).
In [Kurata, Nam, 2013; Wei, Zhao, Li, 
2015; Li, Mallik, Chhajed, 2012] incorpo-
rated the retailer into the after-sales service 
modeling. These authors developed the SG 
as a supply chain where both the retailer 
and the manufacturer can sell the after-sales 
services. In such models, the leader is OEM 
and the follower is the retailer. Moreover, 
[Hamidi, Liao, Szidarovszky, 2016] studied 
after-sales services to rental equipment, 
that is, a leasing contract where the lessor 
(the owner of the device) rents to lessee 
(the user of the equipment). In this context, 
the lessor is the leader who specifies the 
maintenance policy first, whilst the lessee, 
as the follower, decides on the lease period 
and usage rate accordingly.
backward induction applied  
to the after-sales services models
It is also essential to explain how the back-
ward induction is implemented in the after-
sales services models through the SG. The 
key point to this process is when the EW 
provider can maximize his profit by the 
consumer’s reservation price. This term 
corresponds to the maximum price a con-
sumer is willing to pay to consume one unit 
of a product or a service, i. e., it is the con-
sumer’s indifference price between purchas-
ing or not purchasing the product [Varian, 
1992; Pindyck, Rubinfeld, 2001; Breidert, 
2006]. The design for this kind of price in 
after-sales services models is linked to the 
characteristics of the consumer’s utility 
function and his degree of risk aversion, 
since failure is a random variable [Murthy, 
Jack, 2014].
In [Murthy, Asgharizadeh, 1998; 1999], 
the reservation price has a fundamental role 
since when the EW provider knows it (sit-
uation without asymmetric information), 
he elaborates his strategy based on the con-
sumer’s reservation prices. When the EW 
provider performs this action plan, he influ-
ences the buyer’s decision and his profit 
becomes maximum. This whole process im-
plies in the absorption of all consumer sur-
plus, similar to the monopolist when apply-
ing the perfect price discrimination (or 
first-degree price differentiation) [Murthy, 
Jack, 2014]. Finally, this process of trans-
ference of consumer surplus to the EW 
provider implies in the buyer’s expected 
utility corresponding to zero.
From the moment the EW provider uses 
the consumer’s reservation price to get max-
imum profit, the backward induction can be 
seen easily. There are two well-defined sub-
games, which are interconnected. The former 
is related to the decision by the owner of 
the equipment (follower), whereas the latter 
is related to the decision by the EW pro-
vider (leader) [Murthy, As gha ri za deh, 1998; 
1999].
First Subgame: Owner of the equipment. 
In the first subgame, it is necessary to 
find the consumer’s reservation prices of 
the after-sales services based on the ob-
jective function of the buyer. Considering 
those prices, the second subgame can be 
solved.
Second Subgame: EW provider. In the 
second subgame, it is necessary to de-
fine the pricing strategy that influences 
the consumer’s decision, ensuring the 
maximum profit to the EW provider.1 
For instance, if the EW provider wants 
the buyer not to choose to buy the equip-
ment, he will show a higher sale price 
than the consumer’s reservation price for 
the acquisition of the device. As conse-
quence, the consumer does not buy the 
item. The consumer’s reservation prices 
are like the reaction function of the fol-
lower firm in the SG.
1 In models in [Murthy, Asgharizadeh, 1999] 
there are other decision variables that the EW pro-
vider must consider, such as the number of custom-
ers and of service channels.
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Therefore, from the explanation of the 
role of the Stackelberg game in the model-
ing of after-sales service, the extended war-
ranty model is to be presented in the next 
section.
2.  ExtEndEd Warranty modEl
The model to be explained in this paper can 
be seen in [Murthy, Jack, 2014]. It is char-
acterized by the uncertainty that surrounds 
the players in their decisions. Each decision-
maker will only take one action at a  time 
without any negotiation (possibility of bar-
gaining) between the parties involved, that 
is, the players will not share payoffs.
The key elements in this modeling are 
the following: the players involved (the OEM 
and the customer), the characteristics of 
the system (a non-repairable item), the prob-
ability of equipment failure, the equipment 
price, and the extended warranty plan shown 
to the buyer. The model is presented in 
a  non-cooperative environment, i. e., each 
player acts individually, seeking to obtain 
the highest possible payoff.
Finally, the singularity of this model is 
due to the OEM making a maximum profit 
if the consumer’s reservation prices (insert 
acronyms) are used to define the price port-
folio. On the other hand, when the OEM 
implements this strategy, the customer’s 
expected profit is zero.
Extended warranty model description
Notation:
 cXΠ  — Customer’s profit, when X = 0, 1 or 
2;
 oemXΠ  — OEM’s profit, when X = 0, 1 or 2;
 Cm — unit cost to produce one piece of 
equipment;
 Pew — the extended warranty price for the 
equipment;
 *ewP  — the consumer’s reservation price for 
the extended warrant;
 Pe — the selling price of the equipment 
to the customer;
 *eP  — the consumer’s reservation price for 
the acquisition of the equipment;
 k — financial loss suffered by the equip-
ment owner if the device fails and 
it is in a non-operational state;
 m — revenue generated by the equipment 
owner when the device is in an op-
erational state;
 p — the probability of the equipment 
not failing;
 s — the level of coverage of the extend-
ed warranty for the equipment. Its 
value can be between (0, 1];
 X — the decision variable of the equip-
ment owner (or customer). Its val-
ue can be 0, 1 or 2;
 y — the vector of the decision variables 
of the OEM.
The OEM shows to the customer the 
equipment. If the buyer purchases the item, 
he will be given revenue m over the extend-
ed warranty period; however, if the equip-
ment fails, the consumer will have financial 
loss k, due to a non-operational state of the 
device. In order to mitigate the effect of k, 
the OEM also presents an extended war-
ranty plan that attenuates the financial loss 
effect. This additional coverage works as 
insurance (or contingent consumption plan) 
when the customer pays the Pew and receives 
financial compensation if the equipment 
fails during the EW period. This amount 
is a fraction of k, that is, sk. The greater 
the value of s, the greater the compensation 
to be paid to the customer.
The decision-making process that sur-
rounds the customer is linked to making 
two interconnected decisions, which are to 
purchase or not the equipment and to ac-
quire or not the extended warranty. The 
buyer must take these decisions at the same 
time.
The stochastic approach of this paper is 
related to the probability of failure (1 – p), 
which is inherent to the equipment and af-
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fects the decisions made by the players. The 
device has two states of nature mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive, the 
operational and the non-operational states, 
which are linked to the probability of failure. 
For each situation, the players’ payoff chang-
es and each event is evaluated through their 
respective probabilities of occurrence to each 
state. For instance, if the probability of 
failure is low, the customer can choose not 
to have the contingent consumption plan.
The hierarchical sequence of steps of the 
model is as follows:
First Step. The OEM presents the equipment 
(Pe) and the extended warranty (Pew) pric-
es to the customer.
Second Step. The customer analyzes those 
prices and makes a double decision: wheth-
er or not to buy the equipment and the 
extended warranty.
Second Step. The players’ payoffs are gen-
erated and the equilibrium is reached 
through the actions taken by players.
Assumptions
1. The equipment is a non-repairable system. 
If the device fails, it will be non-opera-
tional and will not receive maintenance.
2. The customer purchases only one unit of 
the equipment.
3. There is no asymmetry of information 
between players. The customer knows the 
probability of equipment failure and the 
OEM knows the consumer’s reservation 
prices.
4. Both players are risk neutral, seeking 
just an expected maximum monetary re-
turn (profit).
5. The objective function of each player 
ponders the occurrence of events by 
means of their respective probabilities.2 
2 The objective function of the players involved 
has the same features of the expected utility func-
tion by von Neumann — Morgenstern (see [von 
Neumann, Morgenstern, 1947]) since it is separable 
in the consumption of the various states of nature 
and linear in the probabilities.
Thus, the profit also becomes a random 
variable.
6. The OEM is considered the leader (the 
dominant entity), while the customer is 
designated as follower (the dominated 
entity).
Consumer’s perspective
The customer analyzes the prices present-
ed by the OEM, the probability of equip-
ment failure, the financial revenue derived 
from the use of the device and the finan-
cial compensation expected. Based on all 
these elements, the buyer takes a decision 
X which can present the following possi-
bilities:
X = 0, the device is not bought;
X = 1, the device is bought; however, 
without extended warranty plan;
X = 2, the device is bought with extend-
ed warranty plan.
Fig. 1 summarizes the consumer’s deci-
sion problem through his decision tree.
For each decision taken by the customer, 
the following possibilities of profit are pre-
sented:
X = 0, 0 0
cΠ = ; (1)
X = 1, 1
cΠ  = m – Pe – (1 – p)k; (2)
X = 2, 
2
cΠ  = m – Pe – Pew – (1 – p)(1 – s)k. 
(3)
In equation (2), the revenue generated 
by the use of the equipment is a determin-
istic component, i. e., the customer always 
gains m if he buys the item. On the other 
hand, if the customer chooses to have the 
extended warranty plan (equation (3)), the 
revenue will be a random variable due to 
the inclusion of the financial compensation 
expected. In relation to financial loss, it 
will always be stochastic, as uncertainly 
refers to the probability of equipment fail-
ure.
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OEM’s perspective
While the customer has a decision variable, 
the OEM has a vector y of decision variables 
composed of three elements (s, Pe, Pew), by 
means of which the manufacturer defines 
the portfolio of prices. In addition, it should 
be emphasized that the OEM’s payoff is con-
ditioned to the previous action of the buyer. 
Thus, three possibilities of profit can also 
be generated given the customer’s choice:
X = 0, 0
oemΠ  = 0; (4)
X = 1, 1
oemΠ  = Pe – Cm; (5)
X = 2,
2
oemΠ  = Pe + Pew – Cm – (1 – p)sk. (6)
In relation to the structuring of the 
OEM’s profit, in equations (5) and (6), the 
revenue is a deterministic component where-
as the financial loss is a random component 
due to the probability of equipment failure 
(same situation as for the customer’s pay-
off). In equation (6), the OEM’s profit is 
higher if he sells the extended warranty plan 
and the device does not fail, thus the man-
ufacturer does not need to pay the buyer 
the financial compensation.
The way the players’ actions interact re-
sults in the possibility of the problem of 
the decision of the extended warranty being 
modeled via a game theory framework.
adaptation of the extended warranty 
problem as a Stackelberg game
Since the model is presented under a se-
quential structure that makes an intercon-
nection between the players’ actions and 
payoffs and also there is a relation of het-
erogeneous power, the Stackelberg game 
can be applied as a solution method. Each 
decision-maker wants to get the highest 
possible payoff; however, they know that 
their decisions interfere reciprocally (mu-
tual dependence). In this way, the strategic 
plan to be developed by the players is con-
ditioned to what the other can do (reaction 
function). For example, if the manufactur-
er presents a high Pe to the customer in 
order to try to obtain a higher profit, there 
is the possibility that the buyer does not 
purchase of the equipment. In this case, 
both players’ payoff is zero.
Table 2 systematizes how the extended 
warranty model can be interpreted as a Stac-
kelberg game, highlighting the common 
components of both environments.
Equilibrium of the extended warranty 
model
The key point of this model is to find the 
consumer’s reservation prices ( *eP , 
*
 ewP ), due 
to the role they have in players’ decision 
Fig. 1. Consumer’s decision tree
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process. To explore such prices, it is neces-
sary to understand firstly the strategic de-
sign of each player.
Consumer’s strategy
The composition of the customer’s decision-
making process can be divided into two 
parts: the first one is related to the decision 
to purchase the equipment and the second 
one is related to the adhesion to the con-
tingency plan.
The key point for the buyer to purchase 
the device is that his gain must be equal 
to or bigger than the costs related to the 
equipment. Thus, the consumer evaluates 
the decision to have the equipment accord-
ing to the following constraint (7). If the 
gain (G), revenue obtained due to using 
the equipment, is smaller than the expect-
ed loss (L), monetary loss due to the failure 
of the equipment, then the customer will 
not buy the device since it is preferable to 
have a zero profit than to have an expect-
ed financial loss.
Pe ≤ m – (1 – p)k. (7)
Note that if such a constraint is repre-
sented by an equality (equation (8)), the 
customer is indifferent regarding whether 
or not to buy the equipment, so 0 1 
c cΠ = Π .
Pe = m – (1 – p)k. (8)
The extended warranty is seen as a pro-
cess of risk mitigation between different 
states of nature. Thus, the buyer must again 
consider the gains and losses related to the 
contingency plan presented to evaluate its 
economic viability. From this perspective, 
fig. 2 shows the budget line related to the 
purchase of the extended warranty, given 
by following equation:
( )
 = − − ×  − +
 × − − − + −   − +
.
ew
e
ew
ew
e ew
ew
P
G m P
P sk
P
m P k P sk L
P sk
 (9)
Table 2
comparison between the Stackelberg game and the extended warranty model
Element Stackelberg game Extended warranty model
Players The leader and the follower The OEM and the customer
Power structure The leader has the power The OEM has the power
Action taken 
by  the players
The companies choose the optimal level 
of  output for the market
The OEM determines the s, Pe and Pew, 
while the customer determines his 
decision X
Game dynamics Initially, the leader determines how much to 
produce. Then, the follower determines how 
much to produce in order to maximize his 
own profit (considering the leader’s action)
Initially, the OEM determines the s, Pe 
and Pew. Then, the customer assesses 
the price structure and takes his action
Solution Backward induction. Initially, the follower’s 
production amount must be determined and 
his profit maximized considering the leader’s 
previous action. Next, the leader’s profit is 
maximized by his own production amount
Backward induction. Initially, the 
consumer’s reservation prices are found 
(Pe and Pew). Next, the OEM analyzes 
those prices and defines the amount for 
vector y in order to maximize his profit
Equilibrium It is reached when the optimal quantity to  be 
produced for the market is determined, 
considering the sum of the production 
amounts by both companies. The payoffs of 
each company derive from their actions
It is reached when the customer takes 
his action, resulting in the maximum 
profit for the OEM. For this situation, 
the customer’s expected profit is zero
S o u r c e: The authors’ research.
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The budget line presented in fig. 2 allows 
seeing the purchase of the insurance, the 
Y-axis represents the favorable scenario 
(when the equipment does not fail), while 
the X-axis represents the non-favorable sce-
nario (when the equipment fails). Point A 
represents the situation in which the cus-
tomer decides to buy the equipment without 
acquiring the extended warranty, i. e. in case 
a failure occurs his payoff will be discount-
ed by k monetary units and he will not be 
refunded of any fraction s by the extended 
warranty provider, i. e. G = m – Pe – k. On 
the other hand, when the extended war-
ranty is acquired, situation represented by 
point B, the monetary loss is mitigated, 
but at a cost of Pew monetary units, i. e. 
G = m – Pe – Pew at the favorable scenario, 
in order to alleviate the loss in case the 
non-favorable scenario occurs by sk mone-
tary units. The slope of this budget line is 
seen in (10)
ew
ew
P
P sk
 − − + 
. (10)
The negative slope of the budget line implies 
that if the consumer wants to obtain higher 
insurance coverage, it is necessary to pay more 
for it; consequently, the buyer will change 
the consumption in the different states of 
nature (payoff). Therefore, it is impracticable 
to have high coverage by paying less for Pew.
In case of purchasing the extended war-
ranty, this is only justified if it is smaller 
than the expected financial loss due to the 
failure of the equipment. For instance, it 
would not be feasible to have a contingen-
cy plan if the expected loss corresponds to 
10 monetary units, while the price of the 
extended warranty corresponds to 50 mon-
etary units, that is, that insurance would 
not be economically viable (if based only on 
the consumer’s profit function).
Equation (11) represents the constraint 
that satisfies the customer’s decision to have 
the extended warranty.
Pew ≤ (1 – p)ks. (11)
Note that if such a constraint is repre-
sented by an equality (equation (12)), the 
Fig. 2. Consumer’s budget line to the extended warranty
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customer is indifferent regarding whether 
or not to buy the extended warranty.
Pew = (1 – p)ks. (12)
From equation (12), it is possible to ob-
serve that the higher the level of coverage 
s, the more willing to pay for the contin-
gency plan the buyer will be.
The consumer’s reservation prices can 
be seen in equations (8) and (12). Such pric-
es are understood as the prices that will not 
bring expected financial loss to the con-
sumer if the equipment is acquired (equa-
tion (8)) and the extended warranty is ac-
quired (equation (12)). If the manufacturer 
presents lower prices, the buyer will have 
a higher profit.
OEM’s strategy
The starting point for the manufacturer’s 
strategy design is that the equipment will 
only be sold if its price is higher than its 
cost of production:
Pe > Cm. (13)
Equation (13) shows that if the cost of 
production is too high, it may not be fea-
sible to sell the equipment and consequent-
ly the payoff of both players is zero. The 
manufacturer will firstly need to define the 
vector of decision variables that the cus-
tomer will face to make a decision. It is 
important to highlight that the OEM knows 
the customer’s demand curves (shown in 
equations (8) and (12)), which will be used 
to model the price portfolio, maximizing 
the manufacturer’s expected profit and cap-
turing all consumer surplus. The value of 
s is implicit in the extended warranty price 
and does not need to be determined ana-
lytically. Therefore, for any level of s, a Pew 
will be defined.
Note that if the manufacturer proposes 
prices higher than the consumer’s reserva-
tion prices, the costumer will not buy either 
the equipment or the extended warranty 
plan, since it is preferable to have a zero 
payoff to a negative profit.
Table 3 presents the consumer’s reserva-
tion prices, which will be used by the OEM 
to maximize the manufacturer’s decision. 
The conclusion of this process takes place 
when the OEM induces the customer to buy 
the item, but the buyer is indifferent to 
whether to buy or not the extended war-
ranty plan ( 1 2  
c cΠ =Π ).
Finally, the OEM’s optimal strategy is 
the definition of a prices vector, which is 
represented by the following equation (14):
( )* 1oem mm p k CΠ = − − − . (14)
3.  numErical ExamplE
The customer’s and the manufacturer’s op-
timal strategies were previously discussed 
for the extended warranty model. As a way 
of emphasizing the modeling, the following 
data to the numerical example of the mod-
el are taken into consideration: m = $1000, 
k = $600, Cm = $450, p = 0,4 and s = 0,3.
In order to obtain the equilibrium of the 
extended warranty model and to see the 
players’ strategy, four steps should be tak-
en, namely:
Step 1. The OEM needs to define a selling 
price of the equipment above $450; oth-
erwise, the manufacturer will suffer a 
financial loss.
Step 2. Based on the data, it is possible to 
find the consumer’s reservation prices. 
From the equation (8), the *eP  = $640, 
that is, it is the maximum price that the 
buyer will pay to have the equipment. 
From the equation (12), the *  ewP  = $108, 
Table 3
consumer’s reservation prices
*
eP
*
ewP
m – (1 – p)k (1 – p)ks
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that is, it is the maximum price that the 
buyer will pay to have the extended war-
ranty plan. It is necessary to emphasize 
that *  ewP  is lower than expected financial 
loss k.
Step 3. The manufacturer analyzes these 
prices ( *eP , 
*
 ewP ) and takes a decision 
whether or not to sell the equipment 
and the extended warranty plan to the 
customer. As the *eP  > Cm, so the OEM 
can use this price in his portfolio prices, 
on the other hand, the *  ewP  is associated 
with level s of the coverage. The *eP  and 
the *  ewP  are the OEM’s maximum limits, 
which, if exceeded, will result in the 
buyer not acquiring the item or the war-
ranty plan.
Step 4. When the *eP  and the 
*
 ewP  are shown 
to the customer, the OEM’s expected 
profit is $190. If the consumer buys the 
equipment without the extended war-
ranty (X = 1), he will have 40 percent 
chance of gaining $36 000 profit and will 
have 60 percent chance of obtaining 
$24 000 financial loss. Thus, the buyer’s 
expected profit will be 0. For the situa-
tion in which the consumer buys the 
equipment with the extended warranty 
(X = 2), he will have 40 percent chance 
of gaining $25 200 profit and will have 
60 percent chance of obtaining $18 000 
financial loss. Again, his expected prof-
it will be 0. From the moment the con-
sumer buys the device, but is indifferent 
to whether or not to buy the extended 
warranty (both cases ensure the same 
payoff), the manufacturer’s profit will 
be maximum.
Extension
Once the mathematical analysis of the mod-
el is presented, one extension will be shown 
to expand the modeling dynamics. Thus, 
a variation related to the probability of the 
equipment operating without failure is ex-
posed in order to analyze the change of the 
players’ payoffs according to p. The analysis 
related to the probability of the equipment 
operating without failure is made for a range 
of ten possibilities of p. So, the *eP , the 
*
 ewP  
and the OEM’s profit change according to 
the change of p. Table 4 summarizes all 
these results.
As can be seen, the *  ewP  decreases ac-
cording to the increase in p, i. e., these 
variables have opposite trajectories of 
growth. The customer reduces his willing-
ness to pay for the extended warranty since 
the knowledge of p is known to the players. 
Moreover, it does not make sense to pay a 
high amount of coverage if the equipment 
has a high reliability. On the other hand, 
the *  ewP  has the same trajectory of p, a high 
level of reliability implying that the buyer 
is willing to pay a high amount for the 
acquisition of the item, due to the possi-
bility of the consumer’s expected profit to 
increase.
The OEM’s profit changes according to 
the *  ewP . For high values of the 
*
 ewP , the 
manufacturer’s profit increases, i. e., the 
higher the customer’s willingness to pay 
for the equipment, the higher the payoff 
of the EW provider. It is necessary to high-
light that for low levels of p, the OEM 
chooses not to sell the equipment to the 
Table 4
consumer’s reservation prices  
and oEm’s payoff for a range of p
p Πoem, $ *eP , $ *ewP , $
0,001 –49 401 180
0,010 –44 406 178
0,100  10 460 162
0,150  40 490 153
0,300 130 580 126
0,400 190 640 108
0,500 250 700  90
0,800 430 880  36
0,900 490 940  18
0,999 544 994   2
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Fig. 3. OEM’s profit associated to p
buyer since his profit will be negative (sit-
uations in which the cost is higher than the 
revenue, *  ewP  < Cm). Thus, it is better to get 
zero payoff than a negative payoff. Fig. 3 
shows the OEM’s profit trajectory related 
to the probability of the equipment operat-
ing without failure.
4.  concluSion
This paper emphasizes the role of the game 
theory as a useful tool to model problems 
related to the quantitative study of the war-
ranty and the extended warranty, due to the 
existence of multi-players (EW provider — 
consumer) with different strategies and 
goals. Moreover, this study details how the 
Stackelberg game has been applied in the 
quantitative literature on after-sale services.
The model presented is based on the de-
finition of the consumer’s reservation pric-
es, which are the key components in the 
strategy employed by the OEM to define his 
portfolio prices, thus maximizing his prof-
it and extracting all the consumer surplus 
from the customer, leaving the latter with 
zero profit. The model is solved through an 
adaptation of the Stackelberg game, where 
the leader is the OEM and the follower is 
the consumer. Since there is no asymmetric 
information in the model, the OEM uses 
the consumer’s reservation prices to make 
his decision and to influence the customer.
The model can be extended in several 
ways to capture the reality more meaning-
fully:
•	 By removing the hypothesis of informa-
tion asymmetry. Thus, the OEM would 
not know the consumer’s reservation 
prices;
•	 By changing roles between the players, 
i. e., the OEM can be the follower and 
the buyer can be the leader. Thus, new 
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strategies would be defined among deci-
sion-makers.
•	 By considering many different custom-
ers, that is, the manufacturer would face 
a heterogeneous population of buyers. 
Thus, the OEM would need to define a 
portfolio of strategies in order to maxi-
mize his profit.
•	 By incorporating an expected utility 
function to capture the risk aversion 
coefficient. As the failure is a random 
event, it is possible to consider an ex-
pected utility function to model the 
preference of players under uncertainty. 
Moreover, it is also possible to determine 
the Arrow–Pratt risk aversion function 
to classify the players’ preference re-
lated to risk (averse, lover or neutral 
to the risk) [Eeckhoudt, Gollier, Schle-
singer, 2005].
REFERENCES
Annual Report — General Motors. 2015. 
[Elec tronic resource]. https://www.gm.com/ 
content/dam/gm/en_us/english/Group4/
InvestorsPDFDocuments/10-K.pdf (ac-
cessed: 01.09.2016).
Ashgarizadeh E., Murthy D. 2000. Service 
contracts: A stochastic model. Mathemati-
cal and Computer Modelling 31 (10–12): 
11–20.
Bagchi A. 1984. Stackelberg Differential Games 
in Economic Models (Lecture Notes in Con-
trol and Information Sciences). Springer.
Breidert C. 2006. Estimation of Willingness-
to-Pay: Theory, Measurement, Application. 
DUV: Wiesbaden.
Clark G., Armistead C. 1991. After Sales Sup-
port Strategy: A Research Agenda.  Spring-
er: London.
Crow L. H. 1975. Reliability Analysis for Com-
plex, Repairable Systems. Tech. rep. DTIC 
Document.
Eeckhoudt L., Gollier C., Schlesinger H. 2005. 
Economic and Financial Decisions Under 
Risk. Princeton University Press.
Esmaeili M., Gamchi N. S., Asgharizadeh E. 
2014. Three-level warranty service con-
tract among manufacturer, agent and cus-
tomer: A game-theoretical approach. Euro-
pean Journal of Operational Research 239 
(1): 177–186.
Fujiwara-Greve T. 2015. Non-Cooperative Game 
Theory. Springer: Tokyo.
Gibbons R. 1992. Game Theory for Applied 
Economists. Princeton University Press.
Gibbons R. 1997. An introduction to appli-
cable game theory. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 11 (1): 127–149.
Hamidi M., Liao H., Szidarovszky F. 2016. 
Non-cooperative and cooperative game-
theoretic models for usage-based lease con-
tracts. European Journal of Operational 
Research 255 (1): 163–174.
Jonke R. 2012. Managing After-Sales Ser-
vices: Strategies and Interfirm Relation-
ships. PhD thesis, Universitat Stuttgart.
Kurata H., Nam S.-H. 2013. After-sales ser-
vice competition in a supply chain: Does 
uncertainty affect the conflict between 
profit maximization and customer satisfac-
tion? International Journal of Production 
Economics 144 (1): 268–280.
Li K., Mallik S., Chhajed D. 2012. Design of 
extended warranties in supply chains under 
additive demand. Production and Opera-
tions Management 21 (4): 730–746.
Maronick T. J. 2007. Consumer perceptions of 
extended warranties. Journal of Retailing 
and Consumer Services 14 (3): 224–231.
Morris P. 1994. Introduction to Game Theory. 
Springer: N. Y.
Murthy D. N. P. 2000. Maintenance Service 
Contracts. Springer: Boston, MA.
Murthy D. N. P., Asgharizadeh E. 1998. A sto-
chastic model for service contract. Interna-
tional Journal of Reliability, Quality and 
Safety Engineering 5 (1): 29–45.
Murthy D., Asgharizadeh E. 1999. Optimal 
decision making in a maintenance service 
439Extended Warranty: An Approach via Stackelberg Game
RMJ 15 (4): 425–440 (2017)
operation. European Journal of Operation-
al Research 116 (2): 259–273.
Murthy D., Djamaludin I. 2002. New product 
warranty: A literature review. Internation-
al Journal of Production Economics 79 (3): 
231–260.
Murthy D. N. P., Jack N. 2014. Extended War-
 ranties, Maintenance Service and Lease 
Contracts. Springer: London.
Murthy D., Karim M., Ahmadi A. 2015. Data 
management in maintenance outsourcing. 
Reliability Engineering & System Safety 
142: 100–110.
Murthy D., Yeung V. 1995. Modeling and ana-
lysis of maintenance service contracts. Ma-
thematical and Computer Modelling 22 
(10–12): 219–225.
Pindyck R., Rubinfeld D. 2001. Microecono-
mics. 5th ed. Prentice Hall.
Pope N., Ishida C., Kaufman P., Langrehr F. W. 
2014. Extended warranties in the U.S. 
marketplace: A strategy for effective regu-
lation. Journal of Insurance Regulation 
33: 67–86.
Rahman A., Chattopadhyay G. 2015. Long 
Term Warranty and After Sales Service. 
Springer International Publishing: Cham.
Rai B., Singh N. 2004. Modeling and analysis 
of automobile warranty data in presence of 
bias due to customer-rush near warranty 
expiration limit. Reliability Engineering & 
System Safety 86 (1): 83–94.
Shafiee M., Chukova S. 2013. Maintenance 
models in warranty: A literature review. 
European Journal of Operational Research 
229 (3): 561–572.
Thomas M. U., Rao S. S. 1999. Warranty eco-
nomic decision models: A summary and 
some suggested directions for future re-
search. Operations Research 47 (6): 807–
820.
Varian H. 1992. Microeconomic Analysis. 3rd 
ed. Norton.
von Neumann J., Morgenstern O. 1947. The-
ory of Games and Economic Behavior. 
Princeton University Press.
von Stackelberg H. 2011. Market Structure 
and Equilibrium. Springer: Berlin.
Wei J., Zhao J., Li Y. 2015. Price and war-
ranty period decisions for complementary 
products with horizontal firms’ coopera-
tion/noncooperation strategies. Journal of 
Cleaner Production 105: 86–102.
Yanez M., Joglar F., Modarres M. 2002. Gen-
eralized renewal process for analysis of 
repairable systems with limited failure ex-
perience. Reliability Engineering & Sys-
tem Safety 77 (2): 167–180.
Initial Submission: July 3, 2017
Final Version Accepted: November 8, 2017
Расширенная гарантия: анализ с использованием модели Штакельберга
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Статья призвана продемонстрировать применение теории игр к количественному исследо-
ванию расширенной гарантии (extended warranty). Этот вид послепродажного обслуживания 
представляет собой дополнительное необязательное покрытие, которое потребитель может 
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приобрести после покупки какого-либо устройства, начиная с момента окончания периода 
базовой гарантии. Продемонстрирована модель, в которой взаимодействуют два игрока: из-
готовитель оборудования (OEM-производитель), отвечающий за назначение цен на устройство 
и расширенное гарантийное обслуживание, и покупатель (владелец устройства). Способ их 
взаимодействия моделируется с помощью модели Штакельберга, которая изначально была 
разработана для анализа конкуренции на олигопольном рынке. В представленной модели 
«лидер» представлен OEM, а «последователем» является клиент, где цель OEM — найти 
некоторую ценовую структуру, чтобы максимизировать свою прибыль и влиять на решение 
покупателя. С помощью таких уточнений определяются стратегии и выигрыши игроков. 
Надежность модели обусловлена включением ряда понятий экономической теории (излишек 
потребителя, излишек производителя, резервная цена потребителя, выбор в условиях неопре-
деленности, максимальная прибыль и план потребления в зависимости от условий) и эле-
ментов теории надежности (вероятность отказа и не поддающаяся ремонту система). Кроме 
того, для наглядности предложенной модели приведены числовой пример и анализ чувстви-
тельности. В статье систематизируются этапы применения модели Штакельберга при моде-
лировании расширенной гарантии.
Ключевые слова: расширенная гарантия, теория игр, модель Штакельберга, резервная цена 
потребителя.
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